Confidence: a name of the transference

ZUBERMAN José A.


Confidence is one of the first names that Freud uses to name the transference;

"confidence in the physician" is what he said in the Technical Writings. This confidence is generated only in those cases that Freud called transference neurosis, that is to say neurotics capable of transference, of placing confidence in someone absolutely trustworthy.

The distrusting, the paranoics, are incapable of putting their trust in anybody. Everybody seems to be suspicious, adverse when not enemies, and far from requesting interpretation, they univocally interpret each gesture of the other according to the direction of the persecution delirium. Obviously, Freud distinguishes the incapacity of transference - "in the paranoics all possibility of influence and cure is ceased" -of the transitory distrust, of implication by omission, that is situated so symptomatical as the excess of giving in. (surrender)

With solidarity to that called "confidence in the phisician" he will make a cleavage between suggestion and hypnosis". In this measure we gladly recognize that the results of psychoanalysis lie in the suggestion, that suggestion is always understood as that which, with Ferenezi we see ourselves in it: the influence exercised on the subject by the phenomenae of transference in the possibles." And he adds, " Parallel, we take care of the final independence of the patient by using the suggestion to make it become a psychic labor, that brings with it a permanent betterment of the psychic situation.

The identification of the object is left for hypnosis. Submission that is left to the mercy of an order, via voice or a look from the absolute Other.

This is to say that confidence in the doctor, is as much as the capacity to accept suggestions in relation with the way by which to continue associating with solidarities of the confidence of the word; in other words, the possibilities that symbolic transference offers, brilliantly synthesized by Lacan in the "Sujeto supuesto Saber". (Subject supposed Knowledge)

The love of transference in that Symbolic also lies in the symbolic structure of the unconscious. He who can suppose the knowledge, can also love he who supposes it.

Is, then, love of transference comparable to confidence?

Confidence and friendship remain set in series by Freud in "Dynamics of the Transference". (1)

For Aristoteles confidence is a virtue of friendship, and it is going to distinguish the link between the friends in the relationship lover – loved one.

"They also cannot accept even being friends before they have shown each other to be deserving of mutual affection, nor before having established a reciprocal confidence between each other." (2)

Habitually we set up asynonymy between reciprocity and symmetry, both of which are referred to in the specularity. But to question this reciprocal confidence, we will work with both terms.

"A relationship R is called symmetric if an entity x has a relationship R with y, and then y has the relationship R with x. Example: the cousin’s relationship" (3)

The kantiana category of reciprocity of action and community is the causality of the substances mutually determining themselves one to the other. In the third law of the Newtonian movement to each action opposes a reaction. The reaction is not symmetric but an answer to the cause of the action. Hegel also includes the cause. "Reciprocity presents itself as a reciprocal coincidence of the substances pre-supposed and auto-conditional. Each one is found to be related to the other when it is at the same time an active substance and a passive substance. (3)

Here is where we have to situate the difference between love and the lovers and the confidence of the friends in Aristotoles.. ".... And not how between the lover and that which it loves, because those that love under this last concept do not each have the same pleasure, inasmuch as one takes pleasure in loving and the other receives the care of the lover." (2)

On the other hand: "loving your friend, one loves his own welfare, the welfare for himself, because the good and virtuous man, when he has become a friend to someone, becomes he himself the welfare for whom he loves. And in this way, on the one hand he loves his personal welfare and yet it makes a change in them that is perfectly the same ... because the equality is also called friendship." (2)

It is not a narcisstic equality or specular symmetry, if not Aristotoles would not have affirmed the following: "If friendship is produced with less frequency between the melancholics and the aged people it is because they are people with bad characters who find less pleasure in relationships that are of a reciprocal nature."

Reciprocity makes, then, to support itself as much in the subject as in the object of the friendship. The friend takes care of his place as object as much as the analyst that of the object cause of the transference. The possibility of taking care of his place as object cause is the possibility for an actively sustained dialogue as subject. It is here where the passive and the active of the aforementioned quote by Hegel makes the reciprocity a mutual confidence that determines that it is, at the same time, object and subject of the friendship. It is not symmetrical, since the symmetrical comes depending on the place in the relationship (cousin of) and the "reciprocal confidence" is a construction in that it "measures the concurrence of time". (2)

So, confidence can be a name of the transference that we can think of in the extension. The love between analysts would be an excess in the extension that would found a bond, a re-bind that would support itself in a sameness, that would hide the fraternal rivalry to support a Unique Master. In addition to being impossible, pernicious as Ideal, it would make Religion, Church.

Confidence is necessary between the analysts in their ties. Confidence to speak, confidence that the other will know how to keep the secret, confidence to present a case, for supporting the rough draft of an investigation, to testify at the pass (la passe). Name of the transference that makes friendship and work possible.

Reciprocity in treatment does not speak of symmetry. The asymmetry or subjective disparity of the transference makes of the function, the Symbolic place of each one in the transferencial tie. Reciprocity in treatment is founded in that one causes the saying that takes the word if it sustains the place of the object cause. Reciprocal confidence is not symmetry nor sameness of function.

If I propose confidence as a name for Transference of work or transference in extension, I also have to point out that to plant distrustfulness is not the same as questioning the analyst, that to press him to give reasons to his practice, like Lacan asked. To interrogate him makes the ethics of our practice in the extension. To plant distrustfulness aims at attacking each transference singularly.

Situate confidence to the concept of Subject supposed Knowledge (Sujeto supuesto Saber) with solidarity and to that of the existence of the unconscious.

An excess of confidence makes that the function of the cause changes, in the reciprocal relationship. The Subject supposed Knowledge (Sujeto supuesto Saber) is an inevitable function in psychoanalysis. But the fact that it did not fall the moment that the transference asked for it was already considered as the resistence of the Super Ego (Superyo), one of the five resistences that Freud worked on.

After having quoted so many serious authors, we could include a gaucho-like quote: "Confidence kills man...and impregnates the woman."

It is that confidence, Subject supposed Knowledge, unconscious imply the Symbolic register that is not all of the structure.

To situate that which is Symbolic of the Freudian unconscious as a register, Lacan obliges us to tie it to the Real and to the Imaginary in order to be able to speak of the structure of the Subject.

José A. Zuberman

Bibliograghical References:

  1. S.Freud: Dinámica de las Transferencïa. (1912) O.C. Tomo II pages 324, 325.
  2. Biblioteca Nueve, Madrid, 1948-

  3. Aristóteles. La moral a Nicómaco. Pages321,322,325. Espasa Calpe, Madrid, 1996.
  4. J. Ferreter Mora. Diccionario de Filosofía, pages 3024,3056. Editurial Ariel. Barcelona, 1994.